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ARTICLE
AUTONOMY IN THE AGE OF AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES
MICHAEL MATTIOLI1
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INTRODUCTION
On March 18, 2018, a 49-year-old woman walking her bicycle across a street
in Tempe, Arizona, was struck and killed by a car operated by the ride-sharing
company, Uber.2 Although about 40,000 people in the United States die in car
accidents each year, this death was unique: the victim was the first pedestrian
killed by an autonomous car.3 In the days that followed, authorities tried to un-
derstand how the car had made its fatal decision. Inconveniently, they had to
rely upon Uber's willingness to share data the vehicle had recorded around the
time of the accident.4 Because autonomous vehicle makers are not required to
I Professor of Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law (Bloomington). I gratefully
thank the organizers and panelists of the Boston University Journal of Science and Technol-
ogy Law's Governing the Internet: Public Access, Private Regulation Symposium.
2 Aarian Marshall, Uber's Self-Driving Car Just Killed Somebody. Now What?, WIRED
(Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.wired.com/story/uber-self-driving-car-crash-arizona-pedes-
trian/ [hereinafter Marshall, Uber Kills Pedestrian]; Daisuke Wakabayashi, Self-Driving Uber
Car Kills Pedestrian in Arizona, Where Robots Roam, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018),
https://nyti.ms/2GMaWfO.
3 Marshall, Uber Kills Pedestrian, supra note 2; Neal E. Boudette, Tesla's Self-Driving
System Cleared in Deadly Crash, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2017) https://www.ny-
times.com/2017/01/19/business/tesla-model-s-autopilot-fatal-crash.html; Wakabayashi, su-
pra note 2.
4 Marshall, Uber Kills Pedestrian, supra note 2.
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disclose accident data, companies like Uber make such data difficult for outsid-
ers, including investigators, to independently access and interpret.5
In 2016, federal investigators were similarly dependent on Tesla to help them
understand how a passenger in one of its autonomous vehicles had died on a
stretch of Florida highway. 6 Without that data, only the most bare facts were
known: the victim was a former Navy SEAL; he was forty years old; his Tesla
Model S collided with a tractor-trailer hauling blueberries; he probably died in-
stantly. 7 Only with Tesla's cooperation were federal investigators able to access
and make sense of data that told the deeper story. (The data revealed the driver
was at least partly at fault.)8 Following a fatal 2018 crash, a spokesperson for the
National Transportation Safety Board stated that the agency was "unhappy" with
Tesla for selectively publicizing certain facts which appeared to exculpate the
company before investigators had completed their analysis of all of the crash
5 See, e.g., Joseph A. Gregor, Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., HWY 16FHO 18, Driver Assistance
System - Factual Report (Jun. 20, 2017) https://dms.ntsb.gov/pubdms/search/docu-
ment.cfm?doclD=453441 &docketlD=59989&mkey=93548 [https://perma.cc/F3YR-LNDH]
("But the vast majority [of data recovered from the vehicle], including the vehicle log files
containing all of the parametric data discussed in this report, was stored in a proprietary binary
format that required the use of in-house manufacturer software tools for conversion into en-
gineering units.").
6 This statement is supported generally by reports of Tesla's willingness to share data with
investigators, and more specifically documents in the NTSB docket. See id. For more exam-
ples showing the public's reliance on Tesla in this respect, see, for instance, Amy Martyn,
Tesla blames drivers who wreck its cars but won't hand over a court order, CONSUMER
AFFAIRS (May 30, 2018), https://www.consumeraffairs.com/news/tesla-blames-drivers-who-
wreck-its-cars-but-wont-hand-over-crash-data-without-a-court-order-0530 18.html
nttps.//perma.cc/ I -L- Uwu /j treporting auLounIs o tn company s unwlklmgess to snare
data).
7 Rachel Abrams & Annalyn Kurtz, Joshua Brown, Who Died in Self-Driving Accident,
Tested Limits of His Tesla, N.Y. Times (July 1, 2016), https://www.ny-
times.com/2016/07/02/business/joshua-brown-technology-enthusiast-tested-the-limits-of-
his-tesla.html; Jordan Golson, Read the Florida Highway Patrol's Full Investigation into the
Fatal Tesla Crash, THE VERGE (Feb. 1, 2017 1:13 PM), https://www.thev-
erge .com/2017/2/l /14458662/tesla-autopilot-crash-accident-florida-fatal-highway-patrol-re-
port [https://perma.cc/B8NP-36AV].
8 Ashley Halsey III, NTSB Says Driver in Fatal Tesla Crash was Overreliant on the Car's
'Autopilot' System, WASH. POST (Sep. 12, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/traf-
ficandcommuting/ntsb-says-driver-in-fatal-tesia-crash-was-overreliant-on-the-cars-autopi-
lot-system/2017/09/12/38e5f1 30-9730-11 e7-82e4-
f1076f6d6152-story.html?utm-term=.22baac62063a [https://perma.cc/T7TA-RVQT]; Junko
Yoshida, Fatal Tesla Crash: That's Not All, Folks, EE TIMES (June 27, 2017),
https://www.eetimes.com/author.asp?doc-id=1331950. But see Aarian Marshall, Tesla Bears
Some Blame for Self-Driving Crash Death, Feds Say, WIRED (Sept. 13, 2017, 7:00 AM),
https://www.wired.com/story/tesla-ntsb-autopilot-crash-death/ [https://perma.cc/4BP3-
WPLQ].
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data.9 These episodes indicate a tension between the public's interest in inde-
pendently evaluating the risks of autonomous vehicles and the value automakers
derive from controlling the disclosure of data.
These tragedies and the data-intensive investigations that followed have also
led some experts to push for greater data-sharing between competing automak-
ers. Data describing a vehicle's location, speed, trip history, external road con-
ditions, and the like could improve safety in two ways: first, by sharing such
data wirelessly while on the road, autonomous vehicles could intelligently coor-
dinate to better avoid collisions; 10 second, by sharing data about crashes and
other important road events after they occur, automakers could make all cars
smarter and safer over time. 1 Because such data can give individual automakers
a competitive edge, however, such data-sharing is not widely taking place. In
light of this, some experts are considering whether automakers should be legally
required to share data, and if so, what these new rules of the road should look
like. 12
As the debate over passenger safety revs up, a second controversy concerning
passenger autonomy has begun. Some auto manufactures, wireless telecoms,
online service providers, and advertisers want to make autonomous vehicles the
next great platforms for ad-funded media and services. 3 To do so, they hope to
repackage and sell (or otherwise monetize) some of the same data at the heart of
9 Faiz Siddiqui, NTSB 'unhappy' with Tesla release of investigative information in fatal
crash, WASH. POST (April 1, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/drgrid-
lock/wp/2018/04/01 /ntsb-unhappy-with-tesla-release-of-investigative-information-in-fatal-
crash/?utm term=.32d568353db9 [https://perma.cc/4UDL-6A69].
'0 Lucas Mearian, Feds Want Cars to Talk to Each Other to Avoid Crashes,
COMPUTERWORLD (Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.computerworld.com/article/3151105/car-
tech/feds-want-cars-to-talk-to-each-other-to-avoid-crashes.html [https://perma.ccIF89E-
84US].
II NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN, U.S. DEP'T TRANSP., FEDERAL AUTOMATED
VEHICLES POLICY 17-18 (2016), https://www.transporta-
tion .gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/AV%20policy%20guidance%20PDF.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X83X-3952].
12 See Sharing Automated Vehicle Records with Everyone for Safety ("SHARES") Act,
H.R. 3430, 115th Cong. (2017) (providing from the establishment of a framework to support
such data-sharing); Ryan McCauley, 3 Concerns Automakers Have With California's Auton-
omous Vehicle Regulations, GOVTECH (Oct. 26, 2016), http://www.govtech.com/fs/3-con-
cerns-automakers-have-with-californias-autonomous-vehicle-regulations.html
[https://perma.cc/LY46-CX7V] (reporting industry concerns over the possibility of such data-
sharing requirements); Jamie Williams & Peter Eckersley, Some Easy Things We Could Do
to Make All Autonomous Vehicles Safer, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Mar. 29, 2018),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/03/some-easy-things-we-could-do-make-all-autono-
mous-cars-safer-faster [https://perma.cc/AZH4-HHY4].
" The Connected Car Opportunity, EMARKETER (Jun. 22, 2017), https://www.emar-
keter.com/Article/Connected-Car-Opportunity/1016065 [https://perma.cc/VB49-6F85].
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the debate over passenger safety.14 Such data includes, for instance, vehicle lo-
cation, speed, heading, and passenger driving habits. Privacy experts warn that
this would open the door to harmful new forms of commercial surveillance.
15
These controversies over safety and privacy have been unfolding inde-
pendently, but they are deeply intertwined. They implicate some of the same
underlying data -and consequently, some of the same underlying policy issues.
Consider, for instance, vehicle location. Congress is now considering a bill that
would allow drivers to opt-out of vehicle location tracking altogether- a meas-
ure that would, if passed into law, appear to conflict directly with a second pend-
ing Congressional bill that would require mandatory data-sharing between au-
tomakers.' 6 Moreover, "consumer privacy" might offer a convenient and
plausible excuse for automakers who are reluctant to share vehicle safety data
purely for competitive reasons. In the autonomous vehicle industry, privacy,
safety, competition, and commerce all seem to be headed for gridlock. 17
Analogous dilemmas exist outside the auto industry. I recently examined a
similar quandary concerning data in the field of healthcare, for instance.18 On
one side were health advocates who argued that hospitals should pool patient
treatment records to advance disease research; on the other side were privacy
experts who cautioned that such data-sharing could open the door to widespread
disclosure of confidential patient information. The problem seemed intractable.
Through discussions with various stakeholders, however, I learned that viewing
the situation in terms of "patient health versus privacy" was facile. The types of
data, the parties interested in it, and their individual motivations were far more
varied than they appeared at first glance. This discovery pointed the way to new
potential solutions. My aim in conducting the study was to show the virtues of a
holistic, ethnographic approach to examining data policy problems.
14 See infra Part II.
"5 Marshall, supra note 8; see also Jamie Condliffe, Why Some Autonomous Cars Are Go-
ing to Avoid the Internet, MIT TECH. REV. (Jan. 10, 2017), https://www.technolo-
gyreview.com/s/603339/why-some-autonomous-cars-are-going-to-avoid-the-intemet/amp/
(discussing security concerns) [https://perma.cc/7L2H-XRHK]; Andy Greenberg, Hackers
Remotely Kill a Jeep on the Highway- With Me in It, WIRED (July 21, 2015)
https://www.wired.com/2015/07/hackers-remotely-kill-jeep-highway/
[https://perma.cc/V9J4-FZY9] (discussing the security vulnerabilities of autonomous vehi-
cles, a topic beyond the scope of this essay).
16 Spy Car Act of 2017, S. 680, 115th Cong. (2017).
17 See NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., FEDERAL
AUTOMATED VEHICLES POLICY: ACCELERATING THE NEXT REVOLUTION IN ROADWAY SAFETY
(2016), https://www.transporta-
tion.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/AV%20policy%20guidance%20PDF.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X83X-3952] (highlighting the importance of data-sharing and suggesting
that it should be mandatory, while on the next page expressing the importance of consumer
choice concerning data collection).
'8 Michael Mattioli, The Data-Pooling Problem, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 179 (2017).
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This essay takes a small first step in the same direction with the driverless
data dilemma. The goals of promoting privacy, safety, competition, and com-
merce are all so deeply intertwined, I argue, that they must be addressed to-
gether. This argument could easily be misread as a critique of earlier scholarly
works that have focused on individual policy goals. To the contrary, other schol-
ars' insightful and valuable work is part of this essay's foundation. This short
essay does not attempt to solve the problem. Instead, it presents a descriptive
snapshot of the current state of play, and closes by raising a set of questions
stemming from my analysis. I hope these questions will prompt useful discus-
sions among policy experts and the public.
Part I explains what types of data autonomous vehicles collect. Part II ex-
plains how this data can improve public safety, and the value automakers derive
from secrecy. Part III explores how some of the same data may be used for mar-
keting purposes in the future. Part IV examines the interplay between the themes
in Parts II and III and presents a set of unexplored questions intended to stimulate
policy discussions.
I. SAFETY AND SECRECY
Despite automakers' ongoing efforts to make vehicles safer, car travel is rel-
atively dangerous. Of the over three-hundred and twenty million people living
in America in 2017,19 about 40,000 died and 4.5 million were injured in car ac-
cidents.2 0 Human error is overwhelmingly to blame.21 From an evolutionary per-
spective, our poor collective driving record might seem understandable: What
in our species' history, after all, could have conditioned us to make split-second
'9 Population and Housing Estimates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU https://www.census.gov/pro-
grams-surveys/popest.html [http://perma.cc/6FL2-2A7D] (last visited Apr. 10, 2018) (report-
ing approximately 327,511,673 living in the United States as of April 10, 2018 at 10:30 PM
Eastern).
20 Motor-vehicle related deaths routinely number in the tens of thousands. See NAT'L
HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., DOT HS 812456, 2016 FATAL
MOTOR VEHICLE CRASHES: OVERVIEW (2017) ("There were 37,461 people killed in crashes
on U.S. roadways during 2016, an increase from 35,485 in 2015."); STATISTICS DEP'T, NAT'L
SAFETY COUNCIL, NSC Motor Vehicle Fatality Estimates, NAT'L SAFETY COUNCIL,
https://www.nsc.org/Portals/0/Documents/NewsDocuments/2018/December_2017.pdf (last
visited Apr. 10, 2018) [http://perma.cc/X5KX-37EB] (showing that there were 40, 1000 mo-
tor-vehicle deaths in 2017). By way of comparison, there were zero deaths in commercial
airlines in 2017. David Shepardson, 2017 safest year on record for commercial passenger air
travel: groups, REUTERS (Jan. 1, 2018, 1:54 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-avia-
tion -safety/201 7-safest-year-on-record-for-commercial-passenger-air-travel-groups-
idUSKBN1EQ17L [https://perma.cc/PMX7-U7F8] ("Airlines recorded zero accident deaths
in commercial passenger jets last year, according to a Dutch consulting firm and an aviation
safety group that tracks crashes .... ").
21 See NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., Automated Vehicles for Safety,
https://www.nhtsa.gov/technology-innovation/automated-vehicles-safety
[https://perma.cc/B7KA-HMDK] ("94 percent of serious crashes are due to human error.").
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decisions while hurtling across the countryside at seventy-five miles-per-hour?
Less understandable, though, is why so many drivers make matters worse by
taking the wheel drunk and distracted. These two activities caused 10,497 and
3,450 deaths, respectively, in 2016 alone. 22
In the United States today, dozens of companies are testing autonomous tech-
nologies that hold the promise of far greater safety. 23 These computer-controlled
vehicles have "eyes" that can see the world with remarkable clarity: 360-degree
cameras can see hazards a person can't; sonar and radar can see in the dark;
spinning lasers can cut through fog and darkness to map a vehicle's surround-
ings; and GPS sensors give autonomous vehicles a sense of geospatial location
and heading that humans innately lack. This data is delivered to on-board com-
puters running software algorithms that predict collisions, merges, lane changes,
and so on.2 4 The software then directs the vehicle to move accordingly. 25 Auton-
omous vehicles are already able to match the safety of most human drivers in
some road settings-and without ever doing so drunk, distracted, drowsy, or an-
gry.
22 USDOT Releases 2016 Fatal Traffic Crash Data, NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY
ADMIN. (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.nhtsa.gov/press-releases/usdot-releases-2016-fatal-traf-
fic-crash-data [http://perma.cc/EKY5-SXXC].
23 See Aarian Marshall, To Save The Most Lives, Deploy (Imperfect) Self-Driving Cars
ASAP, WIRED (Nov. 7, 2017, 12:01 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/self-driving-cars-
rand-report/ [https://perma.cc/PEC6-TCZ6 ] (reporting 43 companies in California alone);
Kirsten Korosec, Here's Where the 10 Federal Self-Driving Car Test Sites Are, FORTUNE (Jan.
21, 2017) http://fortune.com/2017/01/20/self-driving-test-sites/ [https://perma.cc/V24K-
8HVH] (announcing that ten sites throughout the U.S. had been selected by the Department
of Transportation for "developing and testing self-driving car technology"). See also Alison
Veflisco kayome, voster: I ne teaaers ins eij-ariving cars, LN)NET tieo. 1, ZJ 16n, 9:.3 / vi),
https://www.zdnet.com/article/dossier-the-leaders-in-self-driving-cars/
[https://perma.cc/BW4C-5ABQ] (listing "leaders" in the development of self-driving cars,
which can be taken as illustrative of how ubiquitous those companies - from General Motors
to Waymo - believe autonomous vehicles may one day be).
24 See, e.g., Cade Metz, How Driverless Cars See the World Around Them, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/technology/how-driverless-cars-
work.html (indicating role of on-board computer situated in trunk) [hereinafter Metz, How
Driverless Cars See the Word]; Cade Metz, Competing with the Giants in the Race to Build
Self-Driving Cars, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/04/technol-
ogy/self-driving-cars-aurora.html (discussing software installed in cars and various ap-
proaches to algorithmic design) [hereinafter Metz, Competing with the Giants]; Todd Span-
gler, Self-driving cars programmed to decide who dies in a crash, USA TODAY (Nov. 23,
2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/cars/2017/11/23/self-driving-cars-pro-
grammed-decide-who-dies-crash/891493001/ [https://perma.cc/WA5X-3UVK]; John Patrick
Pullen, You Asked: How Do Driverless Cars Work?, TIME (Feb. 24, 2015),
http://time.com/3719270/you-asked-how-do-driverless-cars-work/ [https://perma.cc/5ZDS-
8DVF].
25 id.
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The table below lists some of the most common types of data captured by
autonomous vehicles now being tested:
Table 1: Common Types of Autonomous Vehicle Data and Sources
26
................. D a a a-h -r-   . ........ ......... So r e s an N t s
Data Gathered Source(s) and Notes
Vehicle location GPS sensor and chipset
Local time on-board computer
Vehicle make / model on-board computer
Speed on-board sensor(s)
Acceleration on-board sensor(s)
Vehicle Roll Angle on-board sensors
Heading on-board compass
Braking (percentage applied) on-board sensors
Accelerator (percentage applied) on-board sensors
Seatbelts in use on-board sensors
Hands on wheel on-board sensors
Steering input (steering angle) on-board sensors
Vehicle lights (brake, etc.) on-board sensors
26 In the context of this article, "sensor" refers generally to any technology installed on an
autonomous vehicle with the purpose of gathering data. Thus, if a vehicle senses "hands on
the wheel," it necessarily must do so with a sensor of some kind. Table 1 refers to some
specific types of sensors, such as LIDAR and cameras, and alternatively defaults to the gen-
eral term "sensor" to refer to a data-gathering device that isn't specified. The following
sources refer to types of data, as well as specific types of sensors. Event Data Recorders, 77
Fed. Reg. 47,552, 47,557 (Aug. 9, 2012) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 563) (listing require-
ments for data to be captured by event data recorders voluntarily included in many vehicles
by manufacturers); Jamie Condliffe, Lidar Just Got Way Better-But It's Still Too Expensive
For Your Car, MIT TECH. REV. (Nov. 28, 2017), https://www.technolo-
gyreview.com/s/609526/lidar-just-got-way-better-but-its-still-too-expensive-for-your-car/
[http://perma.cc/5AD3-522Y]; Cade Metz, How Driverless Cars See the World around Them,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/technology/how-driver-
less-cars-work.html; Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., Preliminary Report, NTSB: DOCKET
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (June 15, 2017), https://dms.ntsb.gov/public/59500-
59999/59989/604690.pdf [https://perma.cc/72WK-UKPZ] (raw data shared by the NTSB in
connection with Tesla vehicle crash of May, 2016); The Tesla Team, All Tesla Cars Being
Produced Now Have Full Self-Driving Hardware, TESLA: BLOG (Oct. 19, 2016),
https://www.tesla.com/blog/all-tesla-cars-being-produced-now-have-full-self-driving-hard-
ware [https://perma.cc/3WZZ-WUMH].
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Occupancy Sensors built into seats
Environment immediately sur- Camera array (photo and
rounding vehicle 27  video)
Lidar (light detection and
ranging): using lasers, device
creates a 360-degree map of
the car's surroundings.
Radar (radio detection and
ranging): measures distance
from car to surrounding ob-
jects.
Sonar (sound detection and
ranging)
Sound inside vehicle in-vehicle microphone(s)
Phones connected On-board computer (Blue-
tooth)
Apps in use (e.g., online music On-board computer
and entertainment services)
The data that autonomous vehicles collect has enormous value to automakers.
Because highways and roads present more driving situations than a team of pro-
grammers could possibly anticipate, the software directing autonomous vehicles
relies upon artificial intelligence-neural networks28 and machine learning al-
gorithms-that can reason in some ways like a human mind.29 Software devel-
opers "teach" these svstems bv feedina them copious examples of good and bad
decisions-"training data"- from which the algorithm can learn and improve.30
For nearly all autonomous automakers, the sources of this training data are the
very cars they have already put out on the roads.3 1 An automaker's fleet of cars
captures data, which in turn teaches the fleet before it goes out again to capture
more data, and so on. In the auto industry, this virtuous cycle is called "fleet
learning ."32
27 Metz, How Driverless Cars See the Word, supra note 24.
28 Metz, Competing with the Giants, supra note 24.
29 Metz, How Driverless Cars See the Word, supra note 24.
30 See Levi Tillemann & Colin McCormick, Will Driverless-Car Makers Learn to Share?,
NEW YORKER (Sept. 25, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/will-driver-
less-car-makers-learn-to-share [https://perma.cc/EPK5-6J3H]; see also Michael Dempsey,
(H)edge cases in Autonomous Vehicles, MEDIUM (Mar. 9, 2016) https://medium.com/fron-
tier-tech/h-edge-cases-in-autonomous-vehicles-37f75fe63b56.
3' Tillemann & McCormick, supra note 30.
32 Id.
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For all their sophistication, autonomous vehicles remain inferior to most hu-
man drivers. Recent commentary has highlighted the shortcomings of Uber's
vehicles in handling "edge cases"- uncommon road situations that are difficult
to foresee and that only show up in huge sets of training data-lengthy road
signs, interpreting subtle non-verbal cues from other drivers and so forth. 33 Ac-
cording to Brandon Schoettle, a transportation expert at the University of Mich-
igan, although these vehicles might see the world with amazing detail, humans
still understand it better. In a recent interview with Wired, Schoettle commented,
"You're probably safer in a self-driving car than with a 16-year-old, or a 90-
year-old .... But you're probably significantly safer with an alert, experienced,
middle-aged driver than in a self-driving car."34
The way to make autonomous vehicles safer, some experts believe, is to re-
quire vehicle manufacturers to share the data captured by their fleets. In a guid-
ance document published in 2016, the U.S. Department of Transportation
(USDOT) and the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
suggested this idea. 35 In a carefully researched law journal student note, Jesse
Krompier argued that the NHTSA should enact rules mandating the sharing of
automation data between automakers to ensure consumer safety.3 6 A recent ed-
itorial in the Boston Globe expressed a similar view, asking rhetorically, "Do
we want makers of autonomous vehicles to pitch their product based on being
less likely to mow down a pedestrian - or on other features, like comfort, range,
13 Daisuke Wakabayashi, Uber's Self-Driving Cars Were Struggling before Arizona
Crash, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/23/technology/uber-
self-driving-cars-arizona.html [https://perma.cc/6JMQ-3W6D].
34 Aarian Marshall, Puny Humans Still See the World Better Than Self-Driving Cars,
WIRED (Aug. 5, 2017), https://www.wired.com/story/self-driving-cars-perception-humans/.
35 NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., FEDERAL
AUTOMATED VEHICLES POLICY: ACCELERATING THE NEXT REVOLUTION IN ROADWAY SAFETY
18 (2016), https://www.transporta-
tion.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/AV%20policy%20guidance%20PDF.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8D24-U5AQ] ("[E]ach entity should develop a plan for sharing its event
reconstruction and other relevant data with other entities. Such shared data would help to
accelerate knowledge and understanding of HAV performance, and could be used to enhance
the safety of HAV systems.").
36 Jesse Krompier, Note, Safety First: The Case for Mandatory Data Sharing as a Federal
Safety Standard for Self-Driving Cars, 2017 U. ILL. J.L. TECH & POL'Y 439, 455-59 (2017)
("Consumers should not have to choose one self-driving car over another based on which one
has a better understanding of the driving environment and the dynamic objects on the road.").
Other commentators have likewise argued that autonomous vehicles should be made as safe
as possible in a short time span. See Ashley Halsey III, How Safe Is 'Safe Enough' to Put
Driverless Cars on the Nation's Roadways?, WASH. POST (Dec. 10, 2017), https://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/local/trafficandcommuting/how-safe-is-safe-enough-to-put-driveriess-cars-
on-the-nations-roadways/2017/12/10/9a 1aa348-d519-1 1e7-b62d-
d9345ced896d story.html?utm-term=.ecc0b8c46325.
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or whether the speed of the in-car Wi-Fi is fast enough for five passengers to
stream five different Netflix shows.?' 3 7
Experts have also argued that automakers should disclose autonomous vehicle
crash data to the public. In a 2016 statement issued to the NHTSA, for instance,
a consumer interest group wrote, "[flull public access to this test vehicle data,
especially when a crash occurs or a car is incapable of handling a situation on
the road, is indispensable to any meaningful evaluation of whether autonomous
vehicles are safe. '38 Additionally, an executive at Consumer Reports recently
commented to Congress that, "[r]ight now, the safety benefits of autonomous
driving are entirely speculative and based on data held internally. Regulators and
consumers deserve to know the basis that companies use to determine that an
automated technology is safe. This kind of disclosure would only help compa-
nies build trust in their products." 39
Although it might make cars safer, mandatory data-sharing seems to be at
odds with the competitive landscape of the autonomous vehicle industry. Au-
tomakers developing autonomous vehicles rely heavily on trade secrets. These
companies have vocally opposed sharing vehicle data, for fear that it could give
competitors a leg up. 40 For example, in a letter to the California Department of
Motor Vehicles (DMV) the director of safety for Google's autonomous vehicle
program wrote that certain data describing the limits of their autonomous tech-
nology "is highly confidential, particularly during the testing phase before a
product is brought to market."'4 1 He added, "[p]ublic disclosure of this infor-
mation could cause great financial harm to Google." 42 In a similar letter to the
California DMV, the CEO of Uber expressed concerns about a proposed rule
that would have required the disclosure of testing data, writing "[t]he Proposed
Regulations should be revised to recognize that this information can be a confi-
dential trade secret, which should not be subject to disclosure. '43 TechCrunch, a
popular technology news website, has painted a similar picture:
31 Scott Kirsner, For the Sake of Safe Self-Driving Cars, Companies Need to Share Data,
Bos. GLOBE (Mar. 31, 2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2017/03/31/for-sake-
safe-self-driving-cars-companies-need-share-data/itF4HUFL6A I HQMSeDaa5zI/story.html.
" CONSUMER WATCHDOG, Comment Letter on Federal Automated Vehicles Policy, DOT
Docket No. NHTSA-2016-0090 (Nov. 22, 2016), http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/re-
sources/nhtsacomments 11-22-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/U3NH-Y4X2].
39 Disrupter Series: Self-Driving Cars: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Mfg.
and Trade of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 114th Cong. 55 (2016) (statement of
Laura MacCleery, Vice President, Consumer Policy and Mobilization, Consumer Reports),
http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF17/20161115/105416/HHRG-I 14-IF 17-Wstate-
MacCleeryL-20161115 .pdf [https://perma.cc/TG5T-YUTL].
40 Mark Harris, These are the secrets Google wanted to keep about its self-driving cars,
QUARTZ (Aug. 21,2014) https://qz.com/252817 [https://perma.cc/A59R-BDPF].
41 Id.
42 Id.
4' Letter from Anthony Levandowski, Vice-President, Engineering, Uber, to Brian Sou-
blet, Deputy Director and Chief Counsel, Cal. Dep't Motor Vehicles, (Apr. 24, 2017) (on file
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Uber, Lyft and GM have all separately pointed to the vast stores of driving
data collected by their respective fleets as key competitive advantages in the race
to develop truly effective autonomy. And of all the data used to train these sys-
tems - information related to how autonomous vehicles handle challenging
conditions or actual impact events - might be most valuable in terms of creating
a really robust, adaptable self-driving car.
44
In a collection of public comments submitted to the NHTSA in 2016, many
automakers similarly opposed the suggestion of a mandatory data-sharing rule.
4 5
Recent high-profile trade secret lawsuits corroborate the importance of se-
crecy in the autonomous vehicle industry. In 2017, Waymo - a subsidiary of
Google's parent company, Alphabet - sued Uber for misappropriation of trade
secrets.46 The dispute stemmed from Uber's hiring of Anthony Levendowski,
the former head of Waymo's autonomous vehicle efforts.47 Waymo alleged in
the suit that Levendowski had copied a collection of trade secrets to a personal
hard drive before leaving the company, and that those technologies either had
been, or would inevitably be, wrongfully used by Uber.48 The companies settled
the dispute following the discovery stage of litigation, with Uber agreeing not to
use Waymo trade secrets in its autonomous vehicle program, and to transfer an
equity share in Uber worth approximately 245 million dollars to Waymo. 49 As
of this writing, a second trade secret lawsuit involving the automakers Faraday
Future and Evelozcity is unfolding in California. 50 Although the trade secrets in
these two disputes have not been publicized, they relate generally to data sensors
and related software. 5 1 Both the settlement in Uber v. Waymo and the continued
conflict between Faraday Future and Evelozcity suggest trade secrecy is im-
portant to this young industry.
Automakers' possessiveness over vehicle data is understandable. Such data is
not only useful for artificial intelligence ("Al") training, but it is also costly to
with Cal. Dep't Motor Vehicles), https://www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/wcm/connect/66f80f21-
8faf-4ec7-a563-4689fa0b7524/Uber.pdf?MOD=AJPERES [https://perma.cc/GTQ9-LETK].
4' Kate Conger, Federal Policy for Self-Driving Cars Pushes Data Sharing, TECH CRUNCH
(Sept. 20, 2016), http://tcm.ch/2cspFyY [https://perma.cc/7KAB-B755].
41 Jeff Plungis, Should Developers of Driverless Cars Share Test Data?, CONSUMER REP.
(Dec. 8, 2016) https://www.consumerreports.org/autonomous-driving/should-developers-of-
driverless-cars-share-test-data/ [https://perma.cc/HWD9-ZTMK].
46 Waymo LLC v. Uber Tech., Inc., No. C 17-00939 WHA, 2017 WL 2123560, at * 1 (N.D.
Cal. May 15, 2017).
47 Id.
48 id.
49 Aarian Marshall, Uber and Waymo Abruptly Settle for $245 Million, WIRED (Feb. 9,
2018, 12:17 PM) https://www.wired.com/story/uber-waymo-lawsuit-settlement/
[https://perma.cc/2GB6-PLK7] [hereinafter Marshall, Uber and Waymo].
"o Orrick -Trade Secrets Grp., Automation of Our Auto Nation: New Tech Requires A New
Look At Trade Secret Laws, JDSUPRA, (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.jdsupra.com/legal-
news/automation-of-our-auto-nation-new-tech-54948/ [https://perma.cc/84DT-PTBX].
51 Marshall, Uber and Waymo, supra note 49; Orrick, supra note 50.
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gather because it requires deploying vehicles on real roads. 52 Companies that
have invested heavily in capturing such data might have few incentives to share
with companies that have not gathered useful data of their own-quite literally
a "free-rider" problem. Moreover, because reverse-engineering is permissible
under federal and state trade secret laws, a competitor might be able to use such
data to reverse-engineer a valuable algorithm maintained as a trade secret.53 Fi-
nally, the data captured by a vehicle might expose shortcomings in its design,
leading to fewer sales.
At the same time, few would seriously challenge the importance of protecting
the public's safety. Indeed, consumer safety groups aren't the only ones pushing
for data-sharing. Apple, which has invested heavily in developing technologies
for autonomous vehicles, 54 recently urged the NHTSA to set up a framework for
sharing such data, writing, "companies should share de-identified scenario and
dynamics data from crashes and near misses. ' '55 Congress, meanwhile, is cur-
rently considering a bill that would aid the NHTSA in establishing such a frame-
work-The Sharing Automated Vehicle Records with Everyone for Safety Act
(SHARES Act). 56 The House of Representatives Committee on Energy and
Commerce explains that this bill, in part,
establishes a committee within NHTSA for a two-year period to develop a
framework that allows manufacturers of [highly automated vehicles] to
share relevant, situational information related to any testing event on public
streets that results in damage to the test vehicle or any occupant thereof and
validation of such vehicles in a manner that does not risk public disclosure
of such information or disclosure of confidential business information. 57
52 See Kyle Vogt, Why testing self driving cars on the challenging roads of San Francisco
is necessary, RECODE, (Oct. 3, 2017, 3:45 PM) https://www.re-
code.net/2017/10/3/16413068/testing-self-driving-cars-san-francisco-challenging-necessary
[https://perma.cc/YKY5-GY7T].
13 See M. Gethsiyal Augasta & T. Kathirvalavakumar, Reverse Engineering the Neural
Networks for Rule Extraction in Classification Problems, 35 NEURAL PROCESSING LETTERS
131, 132 (2012).
14 Andrew J. Hawkins, Here's a closer look at Apple's secret self-driving car, The Verge,
(Oct. 18, 2017) https://www.theverge.com/2017/10/18/16496182/apple-self-driving-car-pro-
ject-titan-sensor-lidar [https://perma.cc/Y2R5-455U].
15 Plungis, supra note 45.
56 Sharing Automated Vehicle Records with Everyone for Safety Act (SHARES Act) H.R.
3430, 115th Cong. (2017).
57 Memorandum from U.S. H.R. Comm. on Energy and Commerce Majority Staff to Mem-
bers of Subcomm. on Dig. Commerce and Consumer Prot., Hearing entitled "Self-Driving
Vehicle Legislation" (June 23, 2017), http://docs.house.gov/meet-
ings/IF/IF I7/20170627/106182/HHRG- 115-IF 17-20170627-SD02.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5EBH-M2EN].
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An uncomfortable question underlies this debate: How safe is safe enough? 58
If the law required automakers to share event data with each other, competition
over such features would likely be dampened. However, the auto industry as a
whole might achieve an adequate level of safety more quickly than it would un-
der competitive conditions. On the other hand, an industry in which automakers
fiercely compete over driving safety features might yield safety innovations that,
in the long term, make the public safer than it would be under a data-sharing
regime. The cost, however, could be more dangerous vehicles in the near term.
In short, vehicle data-sharing carries short- and long-term costs and benefits.
The next part explains an additional challenge: the same data that can make us
safer may also be used to compromise our privacy.
II. PRIVACY AND COMMERCE
Imagine a summer evening in the near future. You have just left your office
and slip into your new autonomous car. As the vehicle gracefully exits the park-
ing garage, you text your family and read the day's news on a tablet built into
the dashboard. While scanning a news story, you see a colorful ad for a take-out
dinner special at a local chain restaurant. Because the ad is tailored to your con-
sumer profile and loyalty account with the restaurant, it presents a photo of your
favorite item on the menu: the curly fries. You tap a button labeled "ORDER
NOW." Conveniently, you don't need to tell your car to take you to the restau-
rant-it already knows about your order and has started along the fastest route.
After you pick up dinner for your family, the car automatically begins driving
you to your child's daycare. You pass some more time on the tablet and come
across another ad: Verizon, your wireless data provider, is selling a new service
called "Disney Everywhere." For $5 per month, Verizon will deliver unlimited
streaming of select Disney programs to your car. You are seeing this ad, because
Verizon has access to your vehicle's location and has deduced that you stop at a
daycare after work every day. Based on this, it has guessed correctly that you're
the parent of a young child. With a few taps, you sign up for Disney Everywhere.
You and your child contentedly watch the Mickey Mouse Clubhouse and eat
curly fries the whole ride home.
This scenario may sound like science fiction, but advertisers, the auto indus-
try, wireless telecoms, and online content and service providers are steadily
working toward it. In a 2017 report, Forrester Research warned consumers:
"[g]et ready for your car to become yet another 'screen' where publishers and
advertisers will compete for your attention." 59 Adweek, a leading advertising-
58 Halsey III, supra note 36.
59 LARA KOETZLE ET AL., AUTONOMOUS VEHICLES WILL RESHAPE THE GLOBAL ECONOMY:
Six TRANSFORMATIVE RIPPLE EFFECTS OF AUTONOMOUS TRANSPORT (2017), quoted in Ryan
Felton, Advertisers Will Inundate Your Future Autonomous Car With Ads Because Of Course
They Will, JALOPNIK (Aug. 4, 2017, 12:27 PM), https://jalopnik.com/advertisers-will-inun-
date-your-future-autonomous-car-wi- 1797535547 [https://perma.cc/59XP-9TMT]; see Barry
Levine, Will Autonomous Vehicles Provide the Next Screens for Publishers and Advertisers?,
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trade publication in the US, has similarly predicted that car companies "will be
in the position to collect an amazing amount of data from ... cars and those who
ride in them .... [S]elling data will become an increasingly bigger aspect of how
car brands make money." 60
Smartphone app developers, which already have a foothold in vehicles thanks
to the ubiquity of smartphones, are seizing on the opportunities of in-vehicle
advertising today. In March, 2018, the popular navigation software company,
Waze, launched a service that allows businesses to display ads to nearby drivers
using the Waze app.6' On the day of the service's launch, Waze's website ex-
plained that the service will let advertisers "[tiarget drivers who are on the go
near [their] business location with a meaningful local ad experience." 62 The ser-
vice also gives advertisers the ability to "track" potential customers to see "ex-
actly how many potential customers" respond to particular ads.63
Meanwhile, in February 2018, the Southern District of New York issued a
favorable ruling to Vugo, a Minnesota company that places ads in vehicles
driven for ridesharing companies like Uber and Lyft.6 4 Vugo's complaint chal-
lenged the constitutionality of a local New York City law that prohibited adver-
tising in vehicles not licensed by the city's Taxi and Limousine Commission. 65
Relying on Supreme Court precedent, the District Court sided with Vugo, open-
ing the door to in-vehicle advertising in one of the strongest ride-sharing markets
in the country. 66
At least some vehicle manufacturers seem likely to work with third parties to
share vehicle locations, trip histories, and other data necessary for in-car adver-
tising. In March 2018, a company called Telenav was reportedly in "deep dis-
cussions" with several automakers about bringing similar ads to media displays
in privately owned autonomous vehicles.67 In a February 2018 interview, Ford's
MARTECH (Aug. 3, 2017, 2:26 PM), https://martechtoday.com/autonomous-vehicles-provide-
next-screens-publishers-advertisers-201914 [https://perma.cc/J7HZ-KZQF].
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Ready?, ADWEEK (Oct. 30, 2017), http://www.adweek.com/agencies/the-next-great-media-
channel-is-the-self-driving-car-will-brands-be-ready/amp/ [https://perma.cc/8CCK-7W3H].
61 WAZEILOCAL, https://www.waze.comlbusiness/?env=am (last visited Mar. 15, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/8SWR-DUTM].
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Vugo, Inc. v. City of New York, No. 15-CV-8253 (RA), 2018 WL 103339, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2018).
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Gabrielle Coppola & David Welch, The Car of The Future Will Sell Your Data,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 20, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-
20/the-car-of-the-future-wi l-sell-your-data?utm content=tech&utm-campaign=socialflow-
organic&utm source=twitter&utm medium=social&cmpid%3D=socialflow-twitter-tech
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executive director for connected vehicles and services told Bloomberg that au-
tomakers see the ability to share vehicle data- anonymized or personalized- as
an important business opportunity. 68 In the same report, an industry expert told
Bloomberg that "[c]armakers' ultimate objective ... is to build a database of
consumer preferences that could be aggregated and sold to outside vendors for
marketing purposes, much like Google and Facebook do today." 69 "Carmakers
recognize they're fighting a war over customer data," the expert added.70 "Your
driving behavior, location, has monetary value, not unlike your search activ-
ity. ' ' 71 The CEO of a software company working with GM, similarly explained
to journalists that in-car advertising will be attractive to manufacturers, both be-
cause it will serve as a revenue stream, and a platform for building stronger re-
lationships with drivers.72
Even if some vehicle manufacturers don't get involved in sharing vehicle data
for advertising purposes, the mobile ISPs that connect our cars to the internet
still may. Today, wireless firms like Verizon, AT&T, and T-Mobile reportedly
have the technological ability to determine the locations of customers by means
other than GPS - the distance of a caller to a cell tower or known Wi-Fi network,
for instance.73 According to a recent report in the Wall Street Journal, Verizon,
Sprint and other ISPs repackage and sell such data to "data brokers"-compa-
nies that share useful metrics with retailers. 74 One such company called SAP,
for instance, offers a product that can tell retailers detailed anonymized infor-
mation such as "the age ranges and genders of people who visited a store location
between 10 a.m. and noon . . . 75 By combining this information with web
browsing and shopping data (also provided by an ISP), SAP can provide a re-
tailer with an even more detailed portrait. Mobile ISPs may similarly be able to
gather and share vehicle location information with or without an automaker's
participation.
Recent steps by Congress and the FTC have made these new forms of "sur-
veillance capitalism" possible.76 In March 2017, Congress eliminated a set of
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 id.
71 id.
72 Id.
73 Christopher Mims, Your Location Data Is Being Sold- Often Without Your Knowledge,
WALL STREET J. (Mar. 4, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/your-location-data-is-being-
soldoften-without-your-knowledge- 1520168400.
74 id.
75 Kate Kaye, The $24 Billion Data Business.That Telcos Don't Want to Talk About,
ADAGE (Oct. 26, 2015), http://adage.com/article/datadriven-marketing/24-billion-data-busi-
ness-telcos-discuss/301058.
76 See Shoshana Zuboff, Big Other: Surveillance Capitalism and the Prospects of an In-
formation Civilization, 30 J. INFO. TECH. 75 (2015).
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rules adopted by the FCC one year earlier that prevented internet service provid-
ers from sharing certain data with third parties unless a customer had given ex-
press permission. 77 This permitted ISPs to sell data collected from their custom-
ers, including locations, browsing histories, and shopping habits.7 8 As Tom
Wheeler, former chairman of the FCC recently wrote, the repeal of the 2016
FCC privacy rules "allows unrestrained sale of the personal information of any
American using the internet. ' 79
Similarly, the FCC's 2017 repeal of network neutrality rules could make it
possible for wireless ISPs to offer highly tailored content and media packages,
like the hypothetical "Disney Everywhere" service described earlier. The rules
would have prevented ISPs from giving preferential treatment to certain web-
sites or blocking others-activities that are now both allowed. 80 The rationale
for the repeal, as the ISPs tell it, is that the industry needs more revenue to build
infrastructure. 81 The plan is to draw that revenue by charging consumers and
online service providers different rates for varying levels of service. 82 In fact,
prior to the 2017 repeal, Comcast informed the FCC that the expected need for
high-speed data in autonomous vehicles was a reason why network neutrality
should be repealed. 83 Intel, which plans to sell computer hardware for autono-
mous vehicles, has also argued that high speed ("5G") networks will be im-
portant in the autonomous age. 84
77 S.J. Res. 34, 115th Cong. (2017); see also Tom Wheeler, How the Republicans Sold
Your Privacy to Internet Providers, N.Y. TIMES, (Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.ny-
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78 id.
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the FCC on Restoring Internet Freedom 26-7 (July 17,2006), http://update.comcast.com/wp-
content/uploads/sites/33/securepdfs/2017/07/2017-07-17-AS-FILED-Comcast-20 17-Open-
Internet-Comments-and-Appendices.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q38R-MNJH].
82 See Paul Schrodt, What the End of Net Neutrality Means for You, TIME: MONEY (Dec.
15, 2017), http://time.com/money/5065743/how-net-neutrality-decision-affects-you/
[https://perma.cc/KM7Q-X6PR].
83 Comcast, supra note 81, at 56-57. Comcast phrased the comment vaguely, leading some
commentators to criticize the company for incorrectly suggesting that mobile internet connec-
tions would somehow be necessary for vehicle-to-vehicle communications safety. See An-
drew J. Hawkins, Why is Comcast Using Self-Driving Cars to Justify Abolishing Net Neutral-
ity?, THE VERGE (Jul. 18, 2017, 2:54 PM),
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Unsurprisingly, the prospect of widespread vehicle tracking has concerned
privacy experts. Privacy law seeks, in part, to preserve individual autonomy.
8 5
As Dorothy Glancy explained in a recent article on privacy in autonomous ve-
hicles,
[i]n general, personal autonomy privacy interests focus on an individual's
ability to control such matters as who knows where she is now, where will
she go next, when she will depart, how she will get there and with whom,
as well as who can predict or decide where, when, and how she will travel
in the future.8
6
Autonomous vehicle tracking, Glancy argues, would "directly affect the au-
tonomy of travelers by overriding individual control over who or what watches
and keeps track of their movements from place to place."
8 7
The Supreme Court articulated this core privacy concern vividly in the 2012
decision of United States. v. Jones.8 8 The case dealt with whether the govern-
ment's installation of a GPS device on a criminal suspect's vehicle for tracking
purposes constituted a search under the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.8 9 In
a concurring opinion, Justice Sotomayor quoted a passage from a case she had
decided earlier in her career:
"Disclosed in [GPS] data ... will be trips the indisputably private nature
of which takes little imagination to conjure: trips to the psychiatrist, the
plastic surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS treatment center, the strip
club, the criminal defense attorney, the by-the-hour motel, the union meet-
ing, the mosque, synagogue or church, the gay bar and on and on."
90
The mere awareness that one's location is being tracked by the government,
Justice Sotomayor reasoned, can chill our desire to associate and express our-
selves freely. 91 Location tracking by invisible, sprawling networks of companies
buying and selling our location data might reasonably be expected to have a
similar effect. This concern is certainly debatable, but it is bolstered by the fact
that the government is increasingly seeking assistance from technology compa-
nies to obtain data about users.92
85 See Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1907 (2013).
86 Dorothy J. Glancy, Privacy in Autonomous Vehicles, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1171,
1188 (2012).
81 Id. at 1215.
88 565 U.S. § 400 (2012).
89 Id. at 402-03.
90 Id. at 415 (quoting People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195, 1199 (N.Y. 2009)).
9' Id. at 416.
92 See Ian Samuel, The New Writs of Assistance, 86 FORDHAM L. REv. 2873, 2875 (2018).
It is worth noting that the government may have a more difficult time in getting this assistance,
as the Supreme Court held (during the drafting of this essay) that prior to obtaining location
data from cell phones, "the government generally must obtain a warrant supported by proba-
ble cause." Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2221 (2018)
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Lawmakers and regulators are aware of these concerns. The FTC, which has
the responsibility to protect consumer data privacy in connection with autono-
mous vehicles, held an event focused entirely on the issue in June of 2017.93
Also in 2017, Senator Edward Markey introduced a congressional bill that aimed
"[t]o protect consumers from security and privacy threats to their motor vehicles,
and for other purposes." 94 The Bill, titled the "Security and Privacy in Your Car
Act of 2017" or the "SPY Car Act of 2017," provides that "[a] manufacturer
(including an original equipment manufacturer) may not use any information
collected by a motor vehicle for advertising or marketing purposes without af-
firmative express consent by the owner or lessee." 95 It remains unclear, however,
whether this bill would prevent wireless ISPs from gathering and sharing loca-
tion data independently of the GPS sensor in a vehicle.
The auto industry is aware of the privacy concerns too. In an interview with
Bloomberg, a vice president at GM commented, "[i]f consumers want to take
advantage of these kinds of new connected features, especially making pur-
chases while driving or using ride-hailing apps, they'll have to give up at least
some privacy." 96 Interestingly, however, automakers have expressed concerns
over passenger privacy when the government has considered safety rules that
would require them to share data with each other. In recent public comments
solicited by the NHSTA in connection with "V2V" data sharing, approximately
73% of automakers involved expressed privacy concerns in their comments. 97
III. MOVING FORWARD
This essay has provided only a snapshot of the swirl of policy challenges tied
to autonomous vehicle data. These challenges relate to improving public safety,
facilitating commerce, promoting innovation, and ensuring privacy. Policymak-
ers and commentators have tended to focus on each of these problems inde-
pendently. The NHTSA, for instance, has observed the fact that data-sharing
93 Connected Cars: Privacy, Security Issues Related to Connected, Automated Vehicles,
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implicates privacy issues but says the issue falls under the FTC's authority.
Scholars have been more willing to grapple with the interplay between these
policy goals, but the relationships haven't been explored deeply yet. Scholars
who have examined these policy issues in isolation have provided invaluable
insights, however, and their work has laid the necessary foundations for this es-
say.
The policy issues raised by autonomous vehicle data cannot be solved in iso-
lation. A new law mandating extensive data sharing to improve passenger safety,
for instance, might encroach upon passenger privacy and dampen competition.
By the same token, a law forbidding automakers from tracking the locations of
vehicles would promote privacy at the expense of commerce and possibly safety.
Only by deeply grappling with the relationships between safety, commerce, in-
novation, and privacy can we ask the new questions that will push policy ahead.
The following questions, drawn from the foregoing analysis, are offered as start-
ing points:
Question 1: What is the minimal amount of vehicle data from which au-
tomakers can meaningfully improve safety? In a 2011 essay, technology
and social media scholars Danah Boyd and Kate Crawford wrote, "Bigger
Data are Not Always Better Data."98 Their point was that, sometimes, use-
ful things can be accomplished with less than all of the available data. 99
(Volume does not equate to usefulness.) Following on this insight, it would
be helpful for policymakers to have a clearer sense of whether automakers
could learn from one another without sharing their most commercially val-
uable data. According to the reports cited earlier in this piece, the most
useful purpose of data-sharing among automakers would be to reveal
"edge-cases"-scenarios that cars seldom encounter, and might be unable
to handle without specific training. Might it be sufficient in some cases for
automakers to merely be aware of the general nature of an edge case-e.g.,
the side of a white truck being mistaken by a vehicle for the sky-rather
than having all of the data collected by a competitor? Sharing the underly-
ing data from a vehicle might not always be a necessary step for industry-
wide learning. In fact, the research presented earlier in this essay suggests
that lawmakers and the public have often pushed automakers to share data
not necessarily with one another, but with the public. °0 0 This push for pub-
lic accountability following accidents has become somewhat conflated
with the safety benefits that might come from data-sharing. If useful les-
sons can be drawn from generalized descriptions of edge-cases, then per-
haps policymakers could promote safety without diminishing the value of
trade secrets or passenger privacy.
98 Danah Boyd and Kate Crawford, Six Provocations of Big Data 6 (presented at A Decade
in Internet Time: Symposium on the Dynamics of the Internet and Society, Sept. 21, 2011),
http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1926431.
99 See id. at 8.
10' See supra notes 38-39.
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Question 2: Can ISPs play apart in improving safety? As mentioned ear-
lier, in 2017, Comcast submitted a statement to the FCC arguing (a bit con-
fusingly) that the repeal of network neutrality rules would allow telecom-
munications companies to tap new sources of revenue which could fund
the deployment of faster wireless infrastructure. The comment implied that
high speed wireless internet connections are necessary for autonomous ve-
hicle safety. Technology commentators quickly criticized Comcast, as no
planned uses of data for safety purposes would require high speed connec-
tions to the internet.' 0 But perhaps ISPs could be required to make good
on the idea. Imagine a future where vehicles automatically detect and doc-
ument extremely dangerous behavior - the telltale violent swerving of a
drunk driver, for instance. These vehicles might monitor only their own
drivers' behavior, or that of other nearby cars on the road. Such a system
would prompt new privacy concerns, of course, but could also help police
departments across the nation focus their energies on protecting the public
from public safety threats. Under a new legal framework, ISPs might be
required to transmit such automatically-generated police reports across
new highspeed infrastructure (at no extra fee to the sender). The benefits
that such an automatic reporting system would offer might well be out-
weighed by the costs and concerns, however.
Question 3: How safe is safe enough (and when must that goal be met)?
As mentioned earlier in this essay, mandatory sharing of data among au-
tomakers has the potential to improve highway safety in the short term, and
also suggests a reduction in competition for safety-related inventions over
the long term. This could result, in theory, in cars that are less safe in the
long run than they would otherwise be under competitive conditions. This
is not an argument against data-sharing, but rather conjecture regarding the
potential costs to innovation. Policymakers, the public, and the auto indus-
try may need to lace an uncomlortable question: "'low sate is sate
enough?"' 0 2 Autonomous vehicles are unlikely to entirely eliminate high-
way fatalities, but they appear to have the potential to significantly reduce
them. 103 Are we willing to sacrifice long-term safety gains for smaller
short-term improvements? By the same token, are we willing to accept
more danger in the short-term for more long-term safety improvements that
remain speculative?
Question 4: To what extent are automakers relying on trade secrecy ra-
ther than patent protection for their algorithms? The evidence presented
'0 See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
102 Halsey, supra note 36.
103 U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., DOT HS 812 442, AUTOMATED DRIVING SYSTEMS 2.0 A VISION
OF SAFETY, at i (Sept. 2012), https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/docu-
ments/13069a-ads2.0_090617_v9a-tag.pdf [https://perma.cc/MW4Y-3JGN] ("ADSs have
the potential to significantly reduce highway fatalities by addressing the root cause of these
tragic crashes").
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in this essay suggests that some automakers are reluctant to share data be-
cause doing so could help competitors reverse-engineer algorithms main-
tained as trade secrets. If manufacturers more readily sought patent protec-
tion for these algorithms, they would be required to disclose those
inventions to the public, removing a barrier that appears to be hindering
data-sharing. The question would require deeper research to answer, and
could be worth investigating. A hypothesis is that recent Supreme Court
jurisprudence-most notably the Court's decision in Alice Corp. v. CLS
Bank Int'l-has made trade secret protection a more attractive choice for
protecting some types of algorithms that relate to autonomous vehicles.
0 4
Question 5: What if the government required vehicle makers to demon-
strate safety based upon a measure of total vehicle miles or hours? This
idea is offered as both an open question and a possible solution that might
help the industry and the public balance their interests. A rule requiring all
automakers to clock a certain number of accident-free miles- say, five mil-
lion miles across all vehicles in a fleet-under a probationary period could
create new patterns of cooperation. A large automaker could meet the re-
quirement in a short time by adding together the miles traveled by all of its
cars. A smaller automaker with fewer vehicles to test could meet the re-
quirement by joining forces with other small automakers to form a cooper-
ative "fleet" that would be eligible to record a combined number of miles
on the condition that each member of the fleet shares data with the other
members even after the companies meet the mileage threshold -a data
pool. Such a regime would allow for a degree of data-sharing to improve
safety while leaving open the possibility that a large automaker could dis-
tinguish itself in the marketplace by assuring consumers greater privacy by
promising not to share their data. This result aligns with an argument I have
made elsewhere that "incomplete" or fragmented cooperation in some set-
tings is economically and socially optimal.105
So many of the challenges related to autonomous vehicle data are about con-
trol. Automakers want control over this data to preserve a competitive edge. The
automakers with the strongest incentive to do so are those that have the most to
gain from collecting it, and those that have the most to lose from its widespread
disclosure. 10 6 Wireless ISPs, meanwhile, will enjoy immense control over vehi-
cle location data under the current legal and regulatory framework. Congress'
repeal of the FTC's 2016 privacy rules allows ISPs to gather and repackage lo-
cation data and other information that networks of advertisers are eager to buy.
104 Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014).
105 Michael Mattioli, Patent Pool Outsiders, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 225,282-83 (2018).
'
06 A 2017 article exploring the issue seems to capture the problem well: "Safety will be
seen as a key competitive advantage for leaders in autonomous-vehicle technology, and giv-
ing up crash data has negative effects for both leaders and laggards. For leaders, it allows
competitors to profit from their hard-won knowledge - and, potentially, to catch up. For lag-
gards, it exposes vulnerabilities." Tillemann and McCormick, supra note 30.
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The 2017 repeal of network neutrality rules, meanwhile, will allow ISPs to offer
highly tailored data packages and advertising experiences based on location-
tracking. These new forms of surveillance are helpful to advertisers and retailers,
and strike a blow to privacy interests that American law has traditionally sought
to defend.10 7
At the center of it all is the public. Accepting the very idea of an autonomous
vehicle requires a willingness to give up control. But now we must consider how
much control over our privacy and safety we are also willing to give up when
we let computers take the wheel. Likewise, how much control will automakers
give up in order to maximize safety? These questions can't be examined in iso-
lation. Instead, we must understand the data itself, the interests of stakeholders
who want to control it, and how the law governs that control. In this way, we
might hope to resolve the most important question of all: will the public have a
say in the driverless future, or will we all just be going along for the ride?
107 See Glancy, supra note 86; see also Michael McGowan, Driverless Cars: Safer Perhaps,
But Professor Warns of Privacy Risks, GUARDIAN (Sept. 21, 2017), https://www.theguard-
ian.com/technology/2017/sep/22/driverless-cars-safer-perhaps-but-professor-warns-of-pri-
vacy-risks [https://perma.cc/Q6R6-D5E3].
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